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Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers
Abstract
Is discounting of future decision-makers' consumption utilities consistent with "pure" altruism toward
those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better off according to their own, likewise
forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount
functions used in the economics literature. In particular, "hyperbolic" discounting of the form used by
Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) is consistent with exponential altruism towards all future
generations. More generally, we establish a one-to-one relationship between discount functions and
altruism weight systems, and provide sufficient, as well as necessary, conditions for discount functions
to be consistent with pure altruism.
Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers∗
Maria Saez-Marti†







Is discounting of future decision-makers’ consumption utilities consistent with
“pure” altruism toward those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better
oﬀ according to their own, likewise forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that
the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics
literature. In particular, “hyperbolic” discounting of the form used by Phelps and
Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) is consistent with exponential altruism towards all
future generations. More generally, we establish a one-to-one relationship between
discount functions and altruism weight systems, and provide suﬃcient, as well as
necessary, conditions for discount functions to be consistent with pure altruism.
JEL codes: D11, D64, D91, E21.
Keywords: Altruism, discounting, time preferences.
∗This is a revised version of IUI Working Papers No. 572, 2002, “Welfare foundations of discounting”
and No. 575, 2002, “Discounting and future selves.” The authors thank Philippe Aghion, Cedric Argenton,
Geir Asheim, John Leahy, Debraj Ray, Arthur Robson, Ariel Rubinstein and Fabrizio Zilibotti for helpful
comments and suggestions. We are particularly grateful to Ulf Persson who proved and generalized one
of our conjectures.
†Saez-Marti thanks Vetenskapsrådet for financial support of her research.
‡Weibull’s research was partly carried out at the Stockholm School of Economics and at The Research
Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm. Weibull thanks the Laboratoire d‘Econométrie, Ecole
Polytechnique, Paris, for its hospitality during part of his research.
1
1 Introduction
Many economics issues concern sequences of decisions. In models of such situations,
the successive decisions are usually taken either by one and the same individual or by
successive decision-makers, such as the generations in a dynasty. We here analyze a
widely used class of time preferences in such analyses, namely those that permit utility
representation as a sum of discounted instantaneous utilities. Hence, the decision-maker
in each period has some concern for the future - be it his or her own, or that of future
decision-makers. One may then ask the question why the current decision-maker is only
concerned with the instantaneous utility of these future decision makers, when they, like
the present decision-maker, also care about the future? We here ask whether discounting
of future instantaneous utilities is consistent with “pure” altruism towards these future
decision-makers, that is, a concern that future decision-makers are better oﬀ in terms of
their own preferences (total utility).1
Recognition of the economic importance of altruism goes back at least to Edgeworth
(1881), who examined the eﬀects of pure altruism on the contract curve in a two-person
exchange economy. With X and Y denoting the two persons in question, Edgeworth
wrote that
“we might suppose that the object which X (whose own utility is P ), tends
- in a calm, eﬀective moment - to maximize, is not P , but P + λΠ; where λ
is a coeﬃcient of eﬀective sympathy. And similarly Y - not of course while
rushing to self-gratification, but in those regnant moments which characterize
an ethical ‘method’ - may propose to himself as an end Π+ μP .” (op. cit. p.
53).2
Many economists have analyzed, in a wide range of settings, the eﬀect of altruism
for economic agents’ decision-making. For instance, Barro’s (1974) famous analysis of
Ricardian tax neutrality leans heavily on pure altruism of the type studied here: each
generation cares about the next generation’s total utility, which in turn depends on the
following generation’s total utility, in an infinite chain (see Bernheim (1987) for a survey of
this literature, and see Andreoni (1989) for a model that allows for both pure and impure
altruism). The present analysis identifies conditions under which a concern for future
generations’ consumption utilities is, or is not, behaviorally equivalent to pure altruism
towards these future generations. In his study of pure intergenerational altruism, Ray
(1987) called for precisely such an investigation, and we hope to shed some light on this
issue.3
1By contrast, a decision-maker A is sometimes called “paternalistically” or “impurely” altruistic if
A cares about others’ consumption, and/or directly about A’s gifts or bequests to others (“warm glow
eﬀects”), without full regard to all factors of relevance for others’ well-being. Ray (1987) and Hori (2001)
use the term “paternalistic altruism,” while Andreoni (1989) use the term “impure altruism.”
2See Collard (1975) for an analysis of Edgeworth’s treatment of altruism.
3“The representation of non-paternalistic functions in paternalistic form has ... been the subject of
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Our study is most closely related to Zeckhauser and Fels (1968), Kimball (1987), and
Bergstrom (1999), who analyzed the question whether systems of altruistically interde-
pendent utility functions, in an intergenerational context, determine utilities as functions
of allocations. In a similar vein, Hori (2001) investigated the same question in some
more generality in the case of finitely many decision-makers. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the results presented here are all new.
More exactly, we here consider a sequence of decision-makers, one in each time period.
These decision-makers could be successive generations or the successive incarnations of
one and the same individual. The decision-makers are assumed to have preferences that
can be represented as the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities (for example from
consumption). As in most macroeconomic models, the instantaneous utility function
is the same in all periods, and all decision-makers use the same discount function over
their respective futures. Let thus f (t) ∈ [0, 1] be the discount factor that a decision-
maker attaches to the instantaneous utility t periods ahead. Such representations of time
preferences are commonplace in the economics literature. For example, in the seminal
paper by Samuelson (1937), f (t) = δt for some δ ∈ (0, 1), while f (t) = βδt for some
β ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1) in Phelps and Pollack (1968) and Laibson (1997). We will
refer to the first case as exponential discounting and call the second, more general case,
quasi-exponential discounting.4
We ask whether utility functions of this form are consistent with pure altruism towards
future decision-makers in the sense that each decision-maker’s utility can be written as
the sum of own instantaneous utility (from, say, current consumption), and some weighted
sum of all future decision-makers’ total utilities. Let a (t) be the altruism weight that the
current decision-maker implicitly places on the total utility of his or her t:th successor.5
In Edgeworth’s (1881) words, cited above, a (t) is the current decision-maker’s coeﬃcient
of eﬀective sympathy for the decision-maker t periods later.
We find that such a function a always exists and that its values can be determined from
a relatively simple recursive equation (proposition 1). However, there is no guarantee, a
priori, that all function values are non-negative. A negative function value a (t) means
that the decision-maker is “spiteful” to his or her t:s successor, that is, the decision-maker
limited attention .... a systematic analysis of the relationship between these two frameworks is yet to be
written, and appears to be quite a challenge, especially for models with an infinite horizon.” (Ray, 1987,
pp. 113-114)
4Such discount functions are frequently called hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic. We prefer the present
terminology since this class of functions contain exponential (but not hyperbolic) functions as special
cases.
5Altruistic concern for earlier selves seems irrelevant since earlier selves, by definition, do not exist
at the time of the decision in question. The same holds for earlier generations, unless some ancestor is
still alive when the current generation makes its decisions, as in overlapping genertaions models. Kimball
(1987) analyses such a model.
Note, however, that if a decision-maker derives utility from memories of (his or his ancestors) past
consumption, then even a strictly forward-looking altruistic decision-maker may rationally ”invest” in
future memories. However, that falls outside the scope of the present study - see Kimball (1987) and Ray
and Wang (2002) for discussions of these issues.
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prefers allocations that make that later decision-maker worse oﬀ.6 It is thus desirable to
identify conditions on the discount function f that guarantee that all function values a (t)
be nonnegative. It turns out that a suﬃcient condition for this is that f be positive and
that the ratio g (t) = f (t) /f (t− 1) between successive discount factors be non-decreasing
in t (proposition 2). This ratio reflects the decision-maker’s patience concerning events
t periods ahead: it expresses the decision maker’s dislike of a one-period postponement
as a function of how many periods ahead this delay is to occur. The condition thus
requires decision-makers to be more patient with postponements that are further away
in the future - a property that seems to conform with all available empirical evidence
(see for example Frederick et al. (2001)). Moreover, the condition is trivially met by
exponential discounting - since then g is constant - and, more generally, by all quasi-
exponential discount functions. Moreover, the conditions is also met by some, but not all,
hyperbolic discount functions discussed in the psychology literature on time preferences
(see for example Ainslie (1992)). We also show that our “patience” condition is closely
related to, but distinct from, convexity of the discount function f (proposition 4).
As is well-known, exponential discounting - the canonical model in the economics liter-
ature - corresponds to one-period pure altruism: each decision-maker attaches a positive
weight to his or her successor’s utility and zero weight to all other decision-makers. We
show that, in terms of pure altruism, exponential discounting is a boundary case in the
following sense: a necessary condition for altruism towards future decision-makers is that
future periods should not be more heavily discounted than what is obtained by exponen-
tial extrapolation of the discounting from the present to the next period (proposition 3).
Also this necessary condition seems to agree with empirical evidence. However, the con-
dition is evidently violated by certain discount functions used in the economics literature,
namely those that place positive weight on instantaneous utility in some nearby period,
but zero weight on instantaneous utility in some more distant period (as, for example,
when each generation only cares about its own and the next generation’s consumption).
We also find that quasi-exponential discounting in the Laibson-Phelps-Pollak (β, δ)-
form corresponds to exponential altruism: the implied altruism weights decline expo-
nentially over all future decision-makers. Hence, while the special case β = 1 of pure
exponential discounting corresponds to altruism to the next generation only, β < 1 cor-
responds to (positive) exponential altruism to all future generations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in section
2, and section 3 presents our results. Section 4 analyzes a few examples, and section 5
concludes. Mathematical proofs are provided in an appendix.
6Such “spite” may be justified in the context of addiction, however, where the current self may hold
a paternalistic disregard for the preferences of the “hooked” future self.
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2 Model
Consider a sequence of decision-makers τ = 0, 1, 2, ... There may be finitely or infinitely
many such decision-makers. However, in order to save on notation and treat the most
challenging case, we henceforth presume an infinite sequence.7 Suppose, thus, that in
each time period t ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, ...} there is a single decision-maker who takes some
action xt ∈ X , where X is the set of alternatives available in each period t (for example,
X may be a set of relevant consumption bundles). For the sake of concreteness, we will
call action xt consumption in period t, and by a consumption stream (or allocation) x we
mean the infinite sequence of consumption vectors xt, x = (x0, x1, ...) ∈ X∞.
Each decision-maker τ has preferences <τ over consumption streams x ∈ X∞. A
preference profile < for the sequence of decision-makers is thus a sequence h<τiτ∈N of
preferences, one for each decision-maker τ . We here focus on preference profiles h<τiτ∈N
for which there exist functions Uτ : X∞ → R, one for each decision-maker τ , such that





for some u : X → R and f : N→ R+ with f (0) = 1. We will call u (xs) the instantaneous
(sub)utility from consumption in period s, and f(t) the discount factor that each decision-
maker attaches to the instantaneous utility t periods later. Hence, each decision-maker
uses the same instantaneous subutility function u and discount function f .
We will say that a sequence hUτ iτ∈N of utility functions (1) is consistent with (additively
separable) pure altruism if for all τ ∈ N and x ∈ X∞,
Uτ (x) = u (xτ) +
∞X
t=1
a (t)Uτ+t (x) , (2)
for some a : N+ → R+, where N+ = {1, 2, ...}. Here a (t) will be called the altruism
weight that the decision-maker places on the welfare or total utility of the decision-maker
t periods later.8
3 Results
Under what conditions is a sequence hUτiτ∈N of utility functions, defined in equation (1),
consistent with pure altruism, and if it is, what are the implied altruism weights? A key
result for answering this and related questions is the following observation:
7All results are easily adapted to the case of a finite number of decision makers.
8The restriction to additively separable altruism is not binding in the present context, see proposition
1.
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Proposition 1 If hUτi is a sequence of real-valued utility functions satisfying equation
(1) for some u : X → R and f : N → R, then hUτi also satisfies equation (2), where
a : N+ → R is the unique solution to
a(t) =
½
f (1) if t = 1
f(t)−
Pt−1
s=1 f(t− s)a(s) if t > 1
. (3)




a (1) if t = 1Pt−1
s=0 a(t− s)f(s) if t > 1
(4)
This recursive equation, which determines f from a (recall the normalization f (0) = 1),
essentially states that the discount factor f(t) attached to the instantaneous utility t
periods later equals that period’s contribution to the utility of all interim decision-makers,
weighted by their respective altruismweights. For example, the discount factor f(2) equals
the altruism weight placed on the decision-maker two periods ahead, plus the altruism
weight placed on the decision-maker one period ahead times that decision-maker’s one-
period discounting: f (2) = a (2) + a (1) f (1) = a (2) + a2 (1).
It is immediate from equation (4) that if the function a is nonnegative, so is f . How-
ever, as pointed out above, and seen in equation (3), a may well take negative values. For
example, a (2) = f (2)− a (1) f (1) = f (2)− f2 (1), so in order for a (2) to be negative it
suﬃces that f (2) < f2 (1).9 In particular, this is the case when f (1) > 0 and f (2) = 0,
as in models where each generation’s welfare is a function of its own consumption and
that of its immediate descendant. Another example of negative utility weights a (t) is
when f (0) = 1 and f(t) = 1/ (0.5 + t) for all t > 0; again f2 (1) > f (2). A third example
is f(t) = 1/ (1 + t2) for all t. A fourth example is when the parameter β in the quasi-
exponential (β, δ)-representation kicks in with one period’s delay, that is, when f (0) = 1,
f (1) = δ and f (t) = βδt for all t ≥ 2. Then a (2) = (β − 1) δ2 < 0 for all β < 1.
For what class of discount functions f can one then guarantee that all welfare weights
a (t) are nonnegative? It turns out that a suﬃcient condition for this is that f be every-
where positive and that the associated “patience” function g : N+ → R, defined by
g (t) = f (t) /f (t− 1), be non-decreasing. This condition is clearly met by all quasi-
exponential discount functions with β ≤ 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose f > 0, and let g be the associated patience function. If g is
non-decreasing, then a ≥ 0. If g is strictly increasing, then a > 0.
We note that if both f and a are non-negative - as under the hypothesis of proposition
2 - then the altruistic weight a (t) attached to the decision-maker in any period t cannot
exceed the discount factor f (t) attached to consumption in that period; by equation (3)
9More generally, it is easy to verify that equation (3) gives a (t) = (−1)t+1f (1)t for all t ≥ 1 if f (t) = 0
for all t > 1.
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we have 0 ≤ a (t) ≤ f (t) for all t > 0. In particular, if f (t) goes to zero as t goes to
infinity, then so does a (t).
Another observation is that the hypothesis in proposition 2 is closely related to, but
distinct from, the condition that f be convex, where we call a function f : N→ R convex
if its piece-wise aﬃne extension to R+ is convex.10 It is easy to see that convexity is not
suﬃcient for the altruism weights to be nonnegative. For example, any convex function
with f (0) = 1, f (1) = 0.2 and f (2) = 0.02 has a (2) = −0.02. However, a seemingly
slight strengthening of the hypothesis in proposition 2 eﬀectively requires f to be convex.
To see this, let f˜ : R+ → R be twice diﬀerentiable with f˜ (0) = 1, f˜ > 0 and f˜ 0 ≤ 0, and
let G : R2+ → R be defined by




Clearly, the restriction of f˜ to N is a discount function f , and the associated patience
function g satisfies g (t+ 1) = G(t, 1) for all t ∈ N. In particular, g is non-decreasing -
as required in proposition 2 - if G01, the partial derivative of G with respect to its first
argument, is nonnegative. Under the latter, somewhat more stringent hypothesis, f˜ , and
hence also f , are convex (and thus, by proposition 2, a is nonnegative):
Proposition 3 If f˜ : R+ → R is twice diﬀerentiable with f˜ (0) = 1, f˜ > 0, f˜ 0 ≤ 0, and
G01 ≥ 0, then f is convex and g non-decreasing.
We next turn to the task of identifying a necessary condition for all altruism weights
to be nonnegative. For this purpose, let us first briefly consider the classical case when
the discount function f is exponential: f (t) = δt for all t, for some δ ∈ (0, 1). It is not
diﬃcult to verify by induction that equation (3) then gives a (1) = δ and a (t) = 0 for all
integers t > 1. In other words, exponential discounting is equivalent to altruism to the
next decision-maker only.
Conversely, one-period altruism implies exponential discounting: if a (1) = α ≥ 0 and
a (t) = 0 for all t > 1, then f (t) = αt for all t (see equation (4)). This is not surprising:
if each decision-maker attaches an altruistic weight α to the next decision-maker, and
zero weight to all others, then the contribution to current welfare from the instantaneous
utility t periods ahead should be the product of how much the current decision-maker
cares about the next decision-maker, how much the next decision-maker cares about his
successor, and so on, up to the t’th decision maker.
These observations concerning exponential discounting can be used to establish a nec-
essary condition for (nonnegative) altruism in general, namely, that the discount function
should not decline faster than exponentially, as compared with its decline from the current
10For all reals t between any two integers k and k + 1, let
f∗(t) = (t− k) f (k + 1) + (k + 1− t) f (k) ,
thus defining a piece-wise aﬃne extension f∗ of f .
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period to the next. Hence, exponential discounting is a boundary case from the viewpoint
of altruism.
Proposition 4 If a ≥ 0, then f(t) ≥ [f(1)]t for all t.
4 Examples
4.1 Quasi-exponential discounting
What altruism weights correspond to the quasi-exponential discounting in the Laibson-
Phelps-Pollak model? Suppose, thus, that f (0) = 1 and f (t) = βδt for all positive
integers t, for some β ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1). Then a (1) = βδ and a (2) = β (1− β) δ2.
By induction in t, it is easily verified that:11
a (t) = β (1− β)t−1 δt ∀t ≥ 1. (6)
Not surprisingly, one-period altruism is obtained when β = 1: then a (1) = δ and a (t) = 0
for all t > 1. By contrast, when β < 1, then one obtains exponential altruism:
Uτ (x) = u (xτ) + α
∞X
t=1
γtUτ+t (x) , (7)
where α = β/ (1− β) and γ = (1− β) δ. Here γ is the constant factor by which altruism
declines over the infinite sequence of future decision-makers. The total utility weight that
(7) places on the aggregate of all future decision-makers is A = αγ/ (1− γ). We note that
γ → 0 and αγ → δ as β → 1. In other words, the representation is continuous at β = 1 -
the boundary case of classical exponential discounting.
Conversely, if the sequence hUτi of utility functions satisfy (7) for some α > 0 and 0 <
γ < 1, then the underlying preferences are behaviorally equivalent with quasi-exponential
discounting with β = α/ (α+ 1) and δ = (α+ 1) γ. In particular, the induced discount
function f is summable iﬀ γ < 1/ (α+ 1), that is, iﬀ the altruism weights do not taper
oﬀ to slowly, given α.12 We also note that if decision makers place altruism weight 1/2t
on its t:th successor - that is, the genetic kinship factor between parent and child - then
α = 1, γ = 1/2, A = 1, β = 1/2 and δ = 1. Hence, in this border-line case, f is not
11Suppose a(s) = β (1− β)s−1 δs for s ≤ t. Then (4) gives




which, after simplification, boils down to a(t+ 1) = β(1− β)tδt+1.
12A function f : N→ R is summable if
PT
t=0 f (t) converges to some real number as T →∞. Summa-
bility is necessary in order for the utility functions Uτ to be defined for constant consumption streams.
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summable - the utility functions Uτ are then not well-defined for constant consumption
streams.13
For the sake of illustration of this one-to-one relationship between discount factors
and altruism weights, we note that Angeletos et al (2001) made the following estimate
of the parameter pair (β, δ) in the Laibson-Phelps-Pollak model, based on annual US
data: β = 0.55 and δ = 0.96. The associated altruism parameters (for annual decision
makers) are thus α ≈ 1.22 and γ ≈ 0.43, which yields total altruism A ≈ 0.92 towards
the aggregate of future decision makers.
4.2 Hyperbolic discounting
Psychologists who have studied temporal preferences of human and animal subjects sug-
gest that the discount function f be hyperbolic, see Herrnstein (1981), Mazur (1987) and
Ainslie (1992). In this vein, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) suggested discount functions
f of the form f (t) = (1 + μt)−γ for μ, γ > 0. It is easily verified that the associated
patience function g is increasing. Hence, all discount functions of the Loewenstein and
Prelec variety are consistent with altruism towards future decision-makers.14 By contrast,
some other, closely related, discount functions are not, as was noted in section 3 above.
There, we saw that if f (0) = 1 and f (t) = (λ+μt)−γ for all t > 0, then the monotonicity
condition for g is violated when λ = 0.5 and μ = γ = 1. (Note that f is non-increasing if
λ, μ ≥ 0 and λ + μ ≥ 1, which we now assume.) In this class of discount functions, the
suﬃcient condition in proposition 2 is in fact also necessary: if (λ+ μ)2 < λ + 2μ, then
a (2) < 0.15 That proposition is thus sharp within this class of discount functions. Ac-
tually, proposition 4 is sharp as well: the necessary condition for (nonnegative) altruism
in that proposition is equivalent with the condition that (λ+ μ)t ≥ λ + μt for all t > 0,
which, in its turn, is equivalent with (λ+ μ)2 ≥ λ+ 2μ.16
5 Conclusions
We started out by asking if discounting of future instantaneous utilities is consistent
with “pure” altruism towards future decision-makers. We identified a recursive functional
equation which establishes a one-to-one relationship between discount factors and altru-
istic weights attached to future generations or future selves. We saw that some discount
functions used in the literature are consistent with altruism towards one’s future selves or
future generations, while others are not. We also established a suﬃcient condition, and
13Note that summability is irrelevant if the intertemporal budget constraint requires finite total con-
sumption of all goods (
P
t xti < +∞ for all i), such as in the case of non-renewable resources.
14We have been unable to obtain a closed-form representation of the altruistic weights corresponding
to hyperbolic discounting.
15This follows from (3), which gives a (2) = f (2)− [f (1)]2, a diﬀerence which is nonnegative precisely
when g is non-decreasing.
16To see this, note that the derivative of (λ+ μ)t−λ−μt with respect to t is nonnegative for all t ≥ 2.
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a necessary condition, for consistency in this respect. These conditions are met by the
quasi-exponential discounting models currently under investigation in the macroeconomics
literature (see, for example, Laibson (1997), Barro (1999), Laibson and Harris (2001) and
Angeletos et al (2001)), as well as by some of the hyperbolic discounting models in the
psychology literature (see, for example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)).
From a behavioral viewpoint, however, separable discounting models seem quite re-
strictive as representations of intertemporal consumer preferences. See, for example, Fred-
erick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2001), Kahneman (2000) and Rubinstein (2001) for
alternative approaches to intertemporal choice. We hope, however, that our study has
shed some light on a somewhat wider path than the well-trodden but narrow path of
exponential discounting.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose hUτi satisfies equation (1) for some u : X → R and f : N → R with f (0) = 1.




a(s)f(t− s) ∀t ∈ N+ . (8)
Hence,





a(s)f(t− s)u (xτ+t) = (9)




















Since the resulting equation holds for all τ , this proves the claim.17
6.2 Proof of proposition 2
Suppose first that g is non-decreasing. Since a (1) = f (1), we have a (1) > 0. Suppose
a(s) ≥ 0 ∀s < t. By equation (3):
17It is easily verified that the change of order of summation in this derivation is justified. For by
assumption Uτ is a real-valued function and hence the sum in the first line converges to some λ ∈ R.
Hence, for every ε > 0 there exists a Tε such that summation from t = 1 up to Tε brings this partial sum
within ε from λ. Given Tε, the order of summation may be changed and the final expression is obtained
by letting ε→ 0.
10




= g(t)f(t− 1)− f(1)a(t− 1)−
t−2X
s=1









= g(t)a(t− 1)− f(1)a(t− 1)
= [g(t)− f(1)] a(t− 1) ≥ 0 ,
where equation (3) was used again for a(t−1), and where the last inequality follows from
the fact that, by assumption, g is non-decreasing with g(1) = f(1).
Secondly, suppose that g is strictly increasing. If a(s) > 0 ∀s ≤ t, then the same
reasoning as above leads to a(t) > [g(t)− g(1)] a(t− 1) > 0.
6.3 Proof of proposition 3
By diﬀerentiation,
G01 (t, s) ≥ 0 ⇔ f˜ 0 (t+ s) f˜ (t) ≥ f˜ (t+ s) f˜ 0 (t) . (11)
Suppose that G01 (t, s) ≥ 0 for all s > 0. If f˜ 0 (t) = 0, then f˜ 0 (t+ s) ≥ 0 for all s > 0, and
hence f˜ 00 (t) ≥ 0. If instead f˜ 0 (t) < 0, then
f˜ 00 (t) = lim
s↓0


























6.4 Proof of proposition 4
Suppose a ≥ 0, and let f be the associated discount function, as defined in (4). Let
α = a (1), and let a∗ be the altruism-weight function defined by a∗ (1) = α and a∗ (t) = 0
for all t > 1. We know from the above observation that the discount function f∗ associated
with a∗ is f∗(t) = αt for all t. However, it follows from (4) that f(t) ≥ f∗(t) for all t > 1
since a ≥ a∗. Hence, f(t) ≥ αt = [f (1)]t for all t > 1.
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